Monday, April 5, 2010

Still Not Winning Them Over in Afghanistan (or Iraq)

Once again I will ask the question. Why do we even bother writing History books? In a previous post on our follies in Afghanistan, I hearkened back to a day when our pre-Vietnam invasion plans might as well have been focused on Iceland for all we knew about Vietnamese culture and politics. So the questions remain, is it that our leaders continue to ask the Military to do things it can't - or does our Military convince leaders it can do things, when it has no clue what it is talking about? Or is it a little of both.? Either way, we should demand better. And we should at least demand that our political and Military leaders can pass the MCAS before they decide to wage war.

Some recent developments in the US's "Marjah" offensive may startle some. But to any of my former History students, it should be more like a "Ho, Hum - I coulda' told you that." Weeks ago, much was made of our "new" strategy in Afghanistan - and how Marjah was a great example - a successful - example of it. Nightly news shows ran with the story of our "control" over the area. That was then and this is now. And what is on the news shows about Marjah? Crickets. Silence.

According to Military officials in charge, things have changed. I would suggest that things never actually changed and that they are realizing the folly of the concept of having "control" over areas of Afghanistan. Here are some of the quotes. And if anything looks familiar to things you know about Vietnam or Iraq - well then you get to take a cookie from the cookie jar - and then cry for the pathetic way yet another war is being conducted in ignorance.


" ... the Taliban have reseized control and the momentum in a lot of ways’’ in northern Marja, Major James Coffman, civil affairs leader for the Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, said in an interview in late March. “We have to change tactics to get the locals back on our side.’’

“You shake hands with them, but you don’t know they are Taliban,’’ Colonel Ghulam Sakhi, an Afghan National Police commander said. “They have the same clothes, and the same style. And they are using the money [we provide to the community] against the Marines. They are buying [improvised explosive devices] and buying ammunition, everything.’’


One tribal elder from northern Marja, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of being killed, said in an interview on Saturday that the killing and intimidation continued to worsen.
“Every day we are hearing that they kill people, and we are finding their dead bodies,’’ he said. “The Taliban are everywhere.’’


Oh my. Does any of this look familiar? Did you really expect them to be wearing badges or id bracelets? The Taliban are a part of the fabric of this society. They were allowed to rise again to such power because we were so focused on Iraq and lost the support of the non-Taliban elements of society. As always, the war was lost before it was fought.

The local problem points to the larger issue as American forces begin to expand operations in the predominantly Pashtun south, where the Taliban draw most of their support and the central government (the one nobody likes or understands) is deeply unpopular.

In Marja, the Taliban are hardly a distinct militant group, and the Marines have collided with a Taliban identity so dominant that the movement appears more like the only political organization in a one-party town, with an influence that touches everyone. Even the Marines admit to being somewhat flummoxed. And we've never, ever heard of that before right? Our own military, confused by an entire situation or context on the ground. And here are a couple of good quotes for you.

“We’ve got to reevaluate our definition of the word ‘enemy,’ ’’ said Brigadier General Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marine expeditionary brigade in Helmand Province. “Most people here identify themselves as Taliban.
“We have to readjust our thinking so we’re not trying to chase the Taliban out of Marja, we’re trying to chase the enemy out,’’ he said.

That's a peach isn't it. Its not about defeating the enemy (assuming we knew who it was) but about redefining who the enemy is so that we're actually succeeding instead of losing.

Right.

Now if you look back through these pages a few entries back, you will see that this is exactly what we did in Iraq and now hope to do in Afghanistan. In Iraq, we retreated behind a small enclave and let the rest of the country self destruct - and called it a victory for the surge. All we really did was protect our own troops better (no question an important element) and protect the Western styled central government. All the while, insurgents have been blowing the country apart. This has only increased as our departure is imminent. Again - not an excuse to stay - just the reason to stop the blow-hards clamoring about our success in Iraq.

And so too will any success we claim in Afghanistan be tainted by our delirium. We have no idea what we are doing in Afghanistan or what will lead to any real success. More than likely, we will define the Taliban as a political party and then say we have actually defeated any Taliban insurgents. Meanwhile, the Taliban will have actually take over the entire country again - just like the Vietnamese communists did - simply because we didn't realize how central a part of the country they actually were.

Don't you just love history.

(see more about this story here)

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